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 Iconoclasm and strategic thought: Islamic State and cultural heritage in 
Iraq and Syria 
 
Introduction 
Islamic State’s destruction of cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq is neither random collateral 
damage nor necessarily an exercise in barbarism. 1 It is targeted and ideologically explicable. It 
represents a core feature of Islamic State’s strategic design. Strategy, in this context, refers to the 
‘use of available resources to gain any objective’. 2  In conditions of armed conflict, strategy 
denotes how actions affect one’s enemy. This understanding provides a foundation to evaluate 
outcomes in war. However, not all outcomes in war are defined solely against the enemy 
combatant. In circumstances where the objective is to influence a different or wider audience 
‘strategy must adjust to the audience rather than assume that the application of force will be 
universally understood in terms of its effect against the enemy’.3 This study shall, therefore, 
illustrates that the destruction of cultural artefacts targets much more than the heritage itself. 
In assessing the strategic intent of Islamic State’s approach to cultural heritage sites it is 
necessary to locate this analysis within the strategic literature. In this context, iconoclasm, as a 
strategy, represents a logical and instrumental means of employing violence to achieve political 
ends. The first section of this paper, therefore, identifies the independent variables necessary to 
effect the application of strategy to cultural heritage and to achieve the objectives of Islamic 
State. To illuminate key questions surrounding the destruction of heritage in order to achieve 
political objectives the analysis applies principles first enunciated in Carl von Clausewitz’s On 
War. The argument here is that the practice of iconoclasm provides a framework to understand a 
strategy of cultural destruction. It contends further that strategic iconoclasm manifests when 
three independent variables are present and interconnected, namely: the degradation and 
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delegitimization of the existing social and cultural fabric; the removal of all reference to a 
previous society or culture; and an attempt to reconstruct society in keeping with a new 
totalitarian vision or ideology. 
The study, therefore, examines whether Islamic State’s management of cultural heritage 
exhibits this trinity of factors. To test the presence of these variables three case studies will be 
assessed: the destruction of the ancient city of Palmyra; the demolition of Sufi, Shi’a and Sunni 
shrines generally; and the destruction of sites in the city of Mosul. The analysis reveals that the 
manner in which Islamic State addresses cultural heritage exhibits one of two tendencies: 
pragmatism in order to extract the most political value out of heritage sites, or dogmatism in 
accordance with its politically religious ideological perspective. The final sections evaluate the 
case study evidence through the lens of strategic theory. The resulting analysis shows whether 
the trinity is manifest in the cases studied and the utility of such a strategy for implementing the 
Islamic State vision. 
 
Clausewitz and Culture  
For Western and many non-Western observers the destruction of cultural heritage in conflict 
zones is ethically and politically untenable. Franceso Rutelli, former Italian Minister of Culture 
and Tourism, argued that designating places like Palmyra as World Heritage Sites by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) represented ‘a victory of 
the culture of the West… until the rude awakening at the hands of the ISIS cutthroats. The 
cutthroats who reinvented, within the framework of a profound conflict within Islam, systematic 
iconoclasm’.45 The identification and denunciation of cultural barbarism, however, provides only 
a partial explanation of the phenomenon. Strategic theory illustrates how ‘iconoclasm’ operates 
as a functional tool that explains why heritage is targeted in conflict zones.  
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In On war, Clausewitz noted: ‘even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be 
regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for 
which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date’.6 Taken to its 
theoretical extreme, Clausewitz argues there is no definitive end to war, for there is always the 
possibility of conflict resuming when political conditions change. Indeed, the potential for a 
resumption of hostilities is inherent in any resistance to a new political order. 7  Elaborating 
Clausewitz’s observation, a singular act of will against the new political order, seemingly as 
insignificant as an unarmed demonstrator’s defiance of an oncoming tank, or stones thrown at 
soldiers of occupation, exhibit an intrinsic political meaning.8 Such acts of resistance, no matter 
how minor, may be harbingers of more organized violence. The questions that arise are: what 
gives resistance its agency to become active in the first place; and, is it conceivable, theoretically, 
to suppress resistance completely? To answer the first question requires insight into the 
individual mind of the rebel, whilst the second requires determining whether it is possible to 
change, or conquer, the mind of every individual who might conceivably adopt an adversarial 
stance.9 It is within this context, as we shall show, that a strategy of iconoclasm functions. 
The widespread destruction of buildings in Bosnia in the 1990s affords a relatively recent 
example of the attempt to wage war on the opponent’s mind. Martin Coward suggests that the 
assault on the built environment constituted an attack on the identities of the communities that 
owned or shared them. 10  Embodying community values over time, the built environment 
becomes a logical target in the context of ethno-nationalist wars: symbolic of the culture to be 
eliminated.11 Thus, targeting the physical space represents the endeavour to change the nature of 
a community in order to ‘erase its existence and/or prevent the possibility of its (continued) 
existence’.12 
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From this perspective, the fighting in Bosnia during Yugoslavia’s wars of dissolution 
witnessed Croatian forces attempting to alter the existing social fabric by removing all reference 
to its former political condition. For example, Mostar’s 500 year-old ‘Stari Most’ bridge long 
connected the ethnic Croat and Bosnian Muslim parts of the town. A significant heritage 
artefact, it symbolized the broader ethno-religious plurality of Bosnia prior to the wars of 
dissolution. First constructed in the sixteenth century, the bridge was pivotal to trade and 
transport across the Ottoman Empire. The passage of different peoples through Mostar formed 
over time a distinctive, syncretic, ethno-cultural Bosnian identity where heterogeneous 
communities peacefully cohabited. The bridge symbolized this pluralist culture. 13 Therefore, the 
destruction of the bridge represented the rejection of a heterogeneous identity, delegitimizing 
what had gone before, whilst simultaneously authenticating Tudjman’s message of ethnic 
exclusivity. As Riedlmayer observes, by 1993 the bridge served no strategic value, having already 
been damaged beyond use, but its obliteration served to eradicate the ‘collective memory’ of 
what the bridge signified.14 
Yet, in November 1993 the Bosnian-Croat Army, shelled structure until it collapsed into 
the River Neretva.15 The act of destruction was entirely symbolic. The then president of Croatia, 
Franjo Tudjman, advocated the creation of the statelet of ‘Herceg-Bosna’ as a home for Bosnian 
Croats and Mostar was to be its capital. For this to happen Tudjman wanted the town ‘cleansed’ 
of non-Croatians. 16  The consequence of Tudjman’s ethno-nationalist vision forced Bosnian 
Muslims to flee western Mostar into the ghettoized east, which the Croatians then subjected to 
siege and bombardment.17 
The destruction of the Stari Most bridge represents what Rambelli and Reinder call a 
concerted attempt at ‘total obliteration’. 18  Riedlmayer’s account of the broader campaign of 
destruction in Bosnia estimates that over a thousand ‘mosques, hundreds of Catholic churches 
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and scores of Orthodox churches, monasteries, private and public libraries, archives, and 
museums were shelled, burned, and dynamited, and in many cases even the ruins were removed 
by nationalist extremists in order to complete the cultural and religious ‘cleansing’ of the land 
they had seized’.19 Presenting data from the Institute for Protection of Cultural, Historical and 
Natural Heritage of Bosnia Herzegovina, he demonstrated that between 1992 and 1995 over 
eighty percent of congressional mosques, forty-six percent of small local mosques, forty-eight 
percent of shrines and mausolea, and thirty percent of buildings built through religious 
endowments had been attacked.20 Consequently, ‘by burning the documents, by razing houses of 
worship and bulldozing graveyards, the nationalists who overran and ‘cleansed’ hundreds of 
towns and villages in Bosnia were trying to insure themselves against the possibility that the 
people expelled and dispossessed might one day return to reclaim their homes and properties’.21  
Any attempt to change people’s minds, forcibly or otherwise, requires a process of 
escalation. As Clausewitz observed, ‘if the enemy is to be coerced you must place him in a 
situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships 
of that situation must of course not be transient – at least not in appearance’.22 Yet, simply 
placing an enemy in an unpleasant situation is not to conquer, or even change the opponent’s 
mind. The potential for dissent and resistance remains inherent in any situation that does not 
result in the absolute obliteration of every facet of the enemy. The escalatory tendency in war 
always pushes in this direction.  
An earlier twentieth century example evinces this tendency. The Nazi occupation of 
Warsaw in World War II saw, at the outset of hostilities, the Luftwaffe target the city’s historic 
sites, as the Nazis considered them representative of Jewish and Slavic culture that required 
obliteration. Following the occupation of the city the Reich deployed the Verbrennungs und 
Vernichtungskommando – Burning and Destruction Detachments – tasked with enacting Hans 
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Frank’s edict that ‘Warsaw will get what it deserves – complete annihilation’. 23  The Nazi 
destruction of Warsaw was neither opportunistic nor simply collateral damage but central to the 
policy of Lebensraum, which envisioned a Neue deutsche Stadt Warschau (‘New German City of 
Warsaw’). In keeping with the Pabst Plan for Warsaw, the intent was to reconstruct the city by 
replicating the architectural ideals of other German provincial towns according to design 
principles that determined everything from street cleaning to transport systems in order to 
rebuild Warsaw as a ‘model city’.24 
The subsequent internment of the Jews and other ‘decadent’ elements of the city’s 
population in ghettoes anticipated the final solution to extinguish all opposition to Nazi rule. As 
Einwohner noted, a population that is ‘isolated, politically powerless and targeted for 
extermination by a powerful regime’, could not be expected to mount any collective resistance.25  
However, the Jewish Ghetto Uprisings of 1943-44 demonstrated otherwise. Interestingly, 
Einwohner argued that the uprisings might not have happened if the conditions inside the 
ghettoes were not so dire. Paradoxically, it was only when the interned realized the hopelessness 
of their situation that they planned resistance. Moreover, the realization ‘facilitated the 
construction of a motivational frame that equated resistance with honor and dignity’.26 
Such resistance intimates that all sides have agency within war. As Clausewitz maintained: 
‘war is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass but always a collision of two living 
forces’.27 Just because you expect an adversary to conform to your coercion does not necessarily 
mean they will. The Nazis may well have believed that interning the residents of Warsaw in 
ghettoes and systematically changing the DNA of the urban environment would render any 
further resistance futile. What they did not anticipate was that people with nothing to lose were 
not necessarily going to accept the destiny the Nazis had predetermined for them. If the death 
camps were the residents’ ultimate fate then fighting to die with honour and dignity would be no 
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worse than dying at Treblinka or Auschwitz. The result of this Nazi miscalculation was that the 
ghetto dwellers escalated the conflict by revolting. It might be argued that the architects of the 
uprisings also miscalculated by over-escalating the conflict against a clearly stronger opponent 
with little prospect of success. The Nazis were ideologically prepared to exterminate the 
inhabitants of the ghettoes no matter the cost. Himmler’s response to the uprisings elucidated 
the point: ‘the city must completely disappear from the surface of the earth and serve only as a 
transport station for the Wehrmacht. No stone can remain standing. Every stone must be razed 
to its foundation’.28 In suppressing the uprisings the Nazis destroyed the city’s major cultural and 
religious sites including: the Bruhl and Saxon Palaces, the churches of Saints Alexander, John, 
Mary, Kazimierz, Hyacinth, and Martin, as well as historic collections of Jewish manuscripts. The 
uprisings, however, were the catalyst not the cause of the destruction. They energized the 
Germans to escalate a process of cultural obliteration to destroy and then re-make the city along 
Nazi principles – a policy they already had in mind. The Nazis, in other words, embarked on a 
deliberate strategy of iconoclasm – cultural destruction. It is to the character of this 
understanding that we next turn. 
 
Iconoclasm as a Strategy 
The etymology of the noun iconoclasm has enjoyed a complex history and presents definitional 
difficulties because the term is essentially contestable.29 Its principal reference is religious. The 
notion is premised on a contested view of the primacy of the role an image plays in a culture or a 
religion. A compound of two Greek words eikon and klasma (to break) implies iconoclasm 
denotes the rejection and destruction of cherished beliefs and images. It does not necessarily 
connote a negative value judgement. As studies by Patrick Collinson, Marshall G. Hodgson and 
David Freedberg have demonstrated in different ways, iconoclasm transmogrifies into a form of 
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iconophobia, a distrust of all images that becomes an accepted cultural attitude premised on 
religious value and the fear of false idols.30 However, the historic practice within monotheistic 
religions of iconomachy has in the post-religious West, as Francesco Rutelli’s usage cited above 
shows, assumes a pejorative connotation. Consequently, UNESCO usage equates iconoclasm 
with barbarism.  
This modern secular usage, nevertheless, is somewhat incoherent. Thus, both the 2001 
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Afghan Taliban and the 2003 toppling of Saddam 
Hussein’s statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square might be considered explicit acts of iconoclasm. Yet 
to label them as such does not necessarily imply a moral valuation. To judge one barbaric and 
the other heroic would constitute a category mistake: that is, confusing things of one kind and 
presenting them as something else.31 Both acts destroyed icons of a previous idolatrous era, 
Jahiliya (pre-Islamic) and Ba’athist, respectively. Absent value judgements, there is no difference 
between the iconoclastic acts.  
In this regard, iconoclasm, like the word ‘terrorism’, has become value-laden. The terms 
of its historical and etymological emergence contribute a further layer of semantic difficulty. 
James Noyes, for instance, argues that the term iconoclast first entered the European lexicon in 
1595 as a result of the spread of Calvinism across the continent. Even so, the practice of 
iconoclasm can be identified in seventh century Arabia. Indeed, in the wake of the Ummayad 
siege of Constantinople (717 ACE) by Caliph Suleyman, the Byzantine Emperor, Leo III, first 
introduced a series of eikon klasmic edicts banning the worship of images between 726 and 729 
ACE. Consequently, applying terms to entirely different historical and cultural contexts 
highlights the need to exercise care when applying universal judgements to particular words, 
especially as the term ‘iconoclasm’ does not have an Arabic equivalent.  
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Despite these semantic caveats the term parsimoniously applied does possess explanatory 
utility. Simply put, iconoclasm is the breaking of images, idols or icons for a political and/or 
religious purpose. This might entail its use as a particular tactic within a broader campaign of 
violence. There is, moreover, a further dimension to iconoclasm that transforms it into strategy. 
Such a strategic appraisal of the practice of iconoclasm requires that preconceived values do not 
affect the appraisal of the means and ends the iconoclast seeks. 
From this perspective, the Nazi occupation of Warsaw, through systematic heritage 
destruction, altering the fabric of society by changing the population demographic, and 
centralization of power, in order to create Neue deutsche Stadt Warscahu, exhibited all the elements 
of the concept of iconoclasm. Furthermore, each element was contingent on one another, but 
consistent in creating the interlocking effect required to produce a logic of iconoclasm. An 
analogous logic may be identified in the Balkans conflict. The Croat forces destroyed secular and 
symbolic heritage, and altered the composition of society through segregation and ghettoization 
for the purpose of turning Mostar into the capital of a newly formed statelet of Herceg-Bosna. 
Accordingly, three linked variables must be present for the manifestation of iconoclasm as a 
strategic logic: firstly, the degradation and delegitimization of the existing societal fabric; 
secondly, the removal of all reference to the previous society; and finally, the reconstruction of 
society in keeping with a new ideology or political religion. Although not necessarily appearing in 
a sequential process, all must be present in some form to exhibit a coherent strategy of 
iconoclasm. 
 
Jihadism and Iconoclasm 
Before analyzing the Islamic State’s strategy of iconoclasm it is necessary to consider the logic of 
iconoclasm within the context of the ideology, or political religion, which Islamic State 
 10 
professes32 This has been the subject of recent scholarly debate.33 Central to this debate is the 
extent to which Islamic State’s thinking represents a form of Salafi-jihadism or a distinctively 
modern formatting of Islam to fashion a distinctively millennial ‘homo islamicus’.34 Salafism, as 
understood by what Olivier Roy somewhat disparagingly terms ‘Islamologists’,35 represents a 
distinctive interpretation of Islam, which stripped of later accretions, promulgates the strict 
replication of the life of the Prophet Mohammad and his rightly guided followers the rashidun in 
contemporary practice. Sunni Salafi-Jihadism may be differentiated from non-violent forms of 
Salafism, according to Quintan Wiktorowicz, in that it deems the current geo-political climate to 
require violent revolutionary jihad in order to restore religious practice to the rightly guided path. 
Crucial to Salafist belief is the notion of tawhid, the unity of God. Tawhid amalgamates three 
concepts: Tawhid al-rububiyya, the oneness of Lordship, or that one God is the creator of all 
(monotheism opposed to polytheism); tawhid al-asma wa-l-sifat, oneness of names, qualities and 
attributes, meaning that God is supreme and unique (the rejection of secularism); tawhid al-
uluhiyya, oneness of worship, meaning that God alone has the right to be worshipped.36  
The latter practice transforms Islam into a living ideal and, in its Salafi-Jihadist recension, 
requires action because ‘god requires affirmative acts to confirm belief and… this characteristic 
is what distinguishes a Muslim’.37 Shiraz Maher argues that simply stating one’s belief in Islam 
and recognizing God as a unified deity, a Muslim only fulfils the requirements for tawhid al-
rubuiyya and tawhid al-asma wa-l-sifat. Tawhid al-uluhiyya would remain unfulfilled because God was 
not actively worshiped. A Muslim who is ‘passive’ is ‘un-practicing’ and thus heterodox. Faith 
necessitates ‘affirmative action’. 38  Drawing on the work of Abdullah Azzam, Maher further 
claims that the positive acts are necessary for tawhid al-uluhiyya and can only be sustained through 
‘stances taken in life’.39 Gilles Keppel similarly identifies an emerging Jihadist dialectic combining 
the search for ‘an all encompassing conception of Islam inspired by the Salafism of the Arabian 
 11 
peninsula and a fervent consultation of a digital “Islamosphere” full of norms and injunctions 
breaking with the “infidel” model of the West’. 40  Contrasting its alternative lifestyle with 
generalized ‘misbelief’, rigorist Salafism reserves salvation for an ‘elect alone’.41 It thus considers 
affirmative action demanding the prevention of shirk (idolatry). Shirk, moreover, is the basis of 
Islamic State’s hostility to any idolatrous reverence of the past, particularly of the pre-Islamic 
Jahiliya era.  
Notwithstanding these claims, it is evident that Islamic State and its precursor, al-Qaeda, 
adopt distinctively heterodox approaches to charismatic leaders, martyrs, venerated personages 
and apocalyptic violence that sits uneasily even with even the most rigorist readings of orthodox 
Sunni Salafism. As Faisal Devji shows, ‘the jihad abandons the authorities and the heartlands of 
Islam by taking to the peripheries assuming there a charismatic, mystical and even heretical 
countenance that dismembers the old social and religious distinctions of Islam’.42 Analogously, 
Olivier Roy observes, the jihadi finds a better translation of their relationship to violence, sex 
and death in Islamic State’s ‘religious terms than in Salafism which is more puritanical and less 
fascinated by violence’.43 The contemporary jihadi, although not necessarily unsympathetic to 
Salafism, is a distinctly post-modern figure practicing a nomadism that leaves the real world 
behind for a ‘jihadi imaginary’.44 In this context its cult of martyrdom and violence fits within ‘a 
very modern aesthetics of heroism and violence’. 45  Significantly, the techniques of reality 
television inform Islamic State’s videos. Indeed, the jihad’s world of ‘reference is far more 
connected to the dreams and nightmares of the media than it is to any traditional school of 
Islamic jurisprudence’.46  
Moreover, the jihadi’s fascination with death and martyrdom is linked to an apocalyptic 
discourse, absent from Sunni legalism. Islamic State’s conviction ‘that the end of the world is 
near’ is both central and new. As a result it assumes that ‘there is no other perspective than war 
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and total…victory’. As Roy observes, ‘this is not utopia, but nihilism’.47 Martyrdom is therefore 
messianic. Consequently, the jihadist endeavour to create a new society from scratch is ultimately 
both nihilistic and iconoclastic.48 From this perspective, ‘Islam comes to exist universally in the 
places where its particularity is destroyed, the presence of its ruins on television screens bearing 
witness to Muslim’s universality as martyr and militant’.49 
 In this apocalyptic context, Islamic State’s online English language magazine, Dabiq 
explains the necessity of thwarting the spread of shirk. It argues that the ‘conspiracy theories’ of 
polytheism (which can be understood to mean symbols of the kuffar, 50  or non-believers) 
exaggerate the power of its opponents to such an extent that ‘Muslims become paralyzed by 
analysis of current events and eventually fear the kuffār more than they fear Allah’.51 Belief in a 
Manichean battle with polytheism permeates jhadist discourse and justifies a recourse to violence 
to prevent the spread of shirk. According to the key Islamic State text, Abu Bakr Naji’s The 
Management of Savagery, ‘our battle is a battle of tawhid against unbelief and faith against the spread 
of polytheism’. 52  This interpretation draws on the life of Mohammad, and emphasizes his 
destruction of the idols around the Ka’ba upon conquering Mecca. 
 A number of post-war political theorists like Leo Strauss, Albert Camus, Eric Voegelin 
and Hannah Arendt have notably dissected the modern relationship between liberalism, 
totalitarianism and nihilism, that sheds an interesting philosophical perspective on the appeal 
Jihadism exerts as a political religion, and the logic of Islamic State’s iconoclasm.53 These writers 
observed that modern liberal, secular societies evinced a relativism, which incubated, somewhat 
paradoxically, two varieties of nihilism.54 The first is a brutal nihilism of the kind that led to 
Nazism and Marxism in Europe. Such activist ideologies seek to destroy all tradition, culture, 
history and ethics and replace them, as seen in Warsaw, through subjugation and conquest with a 
new vision of a worldly utopia. The second offers a more docile alternative that merely aspires to 
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an aimless, postmodern, bourgeois, secularism free from serious value commitments. 55 
Comparing this condition with Fred Halliday’s observation that through ‘its own universalism… 
Islam is a religion without overt ethnic or regional particularism, one that aspires to encompass 
all of humanity within its compass, and which regards other religions and traditions as, 
comparatively, inferior’,56 Jihadism may be understood as an illiberal, ‘total ideological’ panacea, 
which ‘aggregates the entirety of human existence and organization within its system’. 57 As 
jihadism considers everything other than authenticity as bid’a (heretical innovation), it tends 
towards brutal nihilism ‘with its desire to forcibly replace everything other than itself… its 
adherents also recoil at the ‘permissive egalitarianism’ of contemporary societies, seeking a return 
to more assured – albeit absolutist – times’.58  
Ultimately, the jihadist worldview constitutes a gnostic, millennial and nihilistic, political 
religion. Employing the conceptual tools outlined above, it is plausible to assess whether Islamic 
State has employed a consistent logic of iconoclasm. The remainder of this study will therefore 
consider three case studies to test the logic of iconoclasm hypothesis: Palmyra; Shi’a, Sufi and 
Sunni heritage; and Mosul. These separate cases will then be compared in the final section to see 
whether a logic of iconoclasm or iconomachy may be confirmed. 
 
Case Study 1 – Palmyra  
The city of Palmyra is located northeast of Damascus, in the Homs Governorate of Syria, and 
dates as back to the second millennium BCE, primarily being associated with the Palmyrene and 
Roman Empires. In 1980 UNESCO designated it a World Heritage site and in 2013 placed it on 
the UNESCO List of World Heritage in Danger, along with the five other UNESCO World 
Heritage sites in Syria.59 In mid-2015 Islamic State forces captured Palmyra. Upon entering the 
ancient city, Islamic State identified the political capital that could be gained from destroying the 
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ancient heritage given the international chorus of experts calling for the preservation of such 
culturally important pre-Islamic sites.60 
The reason international expertise unanimously condemns the destruction of heritage is 
complex. Marxists like Stuart Hall, argue – somewhat predictably – that there is a relationship 
between Western imperialism and heritage. Heritage, Hall contends, constitutes the material 
embodiment of the spirit of the nation, a collective representation of ‘tradition’, and, hence, 
becomes a pivotal concept in the lexicon of Western virtues.61 Moreover, heritage also implies a 
symbolic power to ‘order, to rank, classify, and arrange, and thus to give meaning to objects and 
things through the imposition of interpretative schemas’.62 Such a relationship between symbolic 
power and education means that ‘though strangers to one another, we form an ‘imagined 
community’ because we share an idea of the nation state and what it stands for [through cultural 
heritage]… identity thus depends on cultural heritage, which binds each member individually 
into the large national story’.63 Henry Cleere further maintains that these notions inhabit a post-
Enlightenment paradigm, where the focus moves from a ‘spiritual’ to a ‘cultural’ continuity.64 
Consequently, the appreciation of the material culture of a secular present overdetermines the 
heritage of a spiritual or religious past, thereby sustaining European political understandings of 
nationhood as well as a shared European identity. Whether or not one accepts this 
characterization of European self-understanding, it nevertheless is plausible to argue that the 
contingent promulgation of cultural continuity through the preservation of the past secures 
national, regional and secular identities.  
This European and subsequently United Nations sponsored approach to heritage might 
therefore be seen as transferring to other parts of the world and their heritage sites, a distinctly 
Western approach to the preservation of non-Western cultures.65 From this perspective, the 
significance of heritage lies in the value ascribed to it by its stakeholders. Therefore, when 
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Islamic State degrades a cultural artefact like Palmyra, embodying cultural values that a secular 
Western aesthetic applauds, it can be seen not only as an attack on the heritage itself, but on the 
secular and culturally pluralist values a liberal Western cosmopolitanism ascribes to it. 
Whether Islamic State understands why a Western aesthetic reveres heritage is not 
necessarily germane to its logic of destruction. What Islamic State does appreciate, however, is 
that imbricating cultural heritage destruction within a wider propaganda programme advances its 
ideology precisely because it anathematizes the West’s reverence for cultural heritage. 
Furthermore, the way that Islamic State leverages territorial advantages obtained through control 
of cultural sites shows a degree of strategic insight. More precisely, the case of Palmyra exhibits a 
carefully orchestrated campaign of targeted destruction and performative showmanship.  
 
Targeted destruction in Palmyra and the recourse to media driven, performative showmanship 
Rather than destroying Palmyra in the most efficient way possible, Islamic State, almost 
immediately, securitized the ancient ruins through measures like extensive land mining.66 The 
tactical outcome was two-fold: demonstrating that the ruins could, if necessary, be destroyed 
with ease; whilst also forcing government forces and coalition bombers to avoid engaging 
Islamic State fighters within the ancient city. Furthermore, these measures provided time and 
opportunity for Islamic State to conceive a way to exploit further its already successful media 
campaign that began with the destruction of artefacts from the Mosul Museum. 
On 26 February 2016, Islamic State posted a video on YouTube showing the destruction 
of these artefacts.67 The video sparked a heated debate on social media about what was being 
destroyed in the video and why. Broadcast across the Internet, screenshots appeared on the front 
pages of newspapers around the globe and continued to be re-circulated on an unquantifiable 
number of outlets and platforms.68 Harmansah states that many consumers experienced ‘visceral 
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reactions’ to the video and continued to disseminate it both to inform others and to declare 
‘their own cosmopolitan, humanitarian, civilized condemnation of these uncivilized acts against 
antiquities’.69 The denunciation of the acts as ‘uncivilized’ appearing in a major archaeological 
journal, from the jihadist perspective, merely revealed the secular and kuffar value-laden 
assumptions permeating the reaction to cultural destruction. Crucially, Islamic State’s 
propaganda arm considered the success derived from the widespread propagation of its video 
together with the subsequent outpouring of Western disgust, a model for future campaigns of 
heritage destruction.  
Upon capturing Palmyra the concern that Islamic State would simply flatten the city 
proved unfounded.70 Understanding its success in Mosul meant that Islamic State could quantify 
the propaganda value derived from a careful dissemination of videos. Therefore, rather than 
destroy large sections of the city, Islamic State slowly but systematically destroyed key heritage 
features, such as the Arch of Triumph, in stages, in order to maximize the media coverage and 
propaganda value of its actions.71 Multiple outputs depicted the destruction of epigraphs and 
statues, which could have been more easily destroyed with explosives along with larger 
structures. Instead, Islamic State gained added symbolic value from the performance of 
destruction. Rather than using explosives and power tools, Islamic State’s film unit depicted 
fighters using their hands to topple statues, or pickaxes and sledgehammers to deface them, 
symbolically reinforcing the narrative that they were continuing the work of Mohammad in 
casting out idols after conquering Mecca. Dabiq clarified the point thus:  
Last month, the soldiers of the Khilāfah, with sledgehammers in hand, revived the 
Sunnah of their father Ibrāhīm (‘alayhis-salām) when they laid waste to the shirkī legacy 
of a nation that had long passed from the face of the Earth. They entered the ruins of 
the ancient Assyrians in Wilāyat Nīnawā and demolished their statues, sculptures, and 
engravings of idols and kings. This caused an outcry from the enemies of the Islamic 
State, who were furious at losing a ‘treasured heritage’. The mujāhidīn, however, were 
not the least bit concerned about the feelings and sentiments of the kuffār, just as 
Ibrāhīm was not concerned about the feelings and sentiments of his people when he 
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destroyed their idols. With the kuffār up in arms over the large-scale destruction at the 
hands of the Islamic State, the actions of the mujāhidīn had not only emulated Ibrāhīm’s 
(‘alayhis-salām) destruction of the idols of his people and Prophet Muhammad’s 
(sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) destruction of the idols present around the Ka’bah when he 
conquered Makkah, but had also served to enrage the kuffār, a deed that in itself is 
beloved to Allah.72 
 
Islamic State’s representation of its iconoclastic destruction of Palmyra achieved a number of 
goals, ranging from the degradation of the existing fabric of society to the propagation of a 
nihilistic millenarianism actively preventing the spread of shirk, all transmitted via a global media 
platform. 
 
Strategic leveraging 
Whilst the focus of discussion about Palmyra concentrated on the damage to the ancient city, it 
would be remiss to ignore the city’s importance for the supply of gas to major Syrian regions to 
the west. Capturing Palmyra in May 2015, Islamic State also seized a number of local gas fields. 
A 2016 report by the International Monetary Fund estimated that ‘after ISIL’s seizure in early 
2015 of the gas fields near Palmyra, production was projected to have fallen to 0.4 billion cubic 
feet per day’, down from 1.1 bcfpd in 2010.73  
Securing these fields afforded Islamic State significant leverage over the Syrian regime. 
As Isabelle Duyvesteyn notes: ‘resource considerations are important factors motivating 
individuals to take up their weapons’.74 The Jabal Shaer gas fields, located approximately 150 
kilometres northwest of Palmyra, have been embroiled in an almost continuous battle for their 
control since July 2014.75 Other gas fields such as Hail and Arak have also been centres of 
fighting since Islamic State began contesting control of Palmyra in 2014. The gas fields 
surrounding Palmyra are critical for the supply of power to key regime strongholds, not least 
Damascus. Estimates suggests that 90 percent of Syria’s electricity infrastructure relies on gas 
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extraction. Furthermore, Palmyra acts as a transit point for pipelines carrying gas from 
northeastern gas fields in Deir ez-Zor, which are currently being contested by the newly formed 
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.76 Control of these sites therefore put Islamic State in a position to apply 
leverage and extract concessions from, the Syrian regime. A good example of Islamic State 
exploiting this leverage is the destruction of the Furqlus pipeline in 2015, which, again, was 
critical to the regime’s gas supply. 
Before 2016, validating Islamic State’s strategic leveraging of its control over vital 
resources was a matter of conjecture. However, in May 2016 a document by Foreign Reports 
Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm focusing on oil and politics in the Middle East, 
reported that Islamic State was turning gas from Palmyrene oil fields into fuel to be sold to the 
regime.77 Analysis of the document leaked to Sky News corroborated the claim demonstrating 
evidence of formal arrangements between Islamic State and the Syrian regime with regard to the 
transfer and exchange of resources. Furthermore, the document also suggested that Islamic State 
leveraged its control of resources to secure the safe withdrawal of weapons from Palmyra before 
the regime retook the city.78 
 
Case Study 2 – Shi’a, Sunni and Sufi Heritage 
Transnational millennarian groups across the Middle East and North Africa favour intentional, 
ideologically driven, destruction as the means for furthering jihad. For example, Ansar al-Din 
captured Timbuktu in 2012 and commenced a systematic campaign of destruction against 
heritage sites in the city. The reasoning was clear. The sites were fifteenth century Sufi 
mausoleums, which jihadist groups considered to be shirk as well as symbols of polytheism. 
Ansar al-Din’s Sanda Ould Boumama explained the reasoning: ‘God is unique. All of this is 
haram [forbidden in Islamic law]’.79 Similarly, Ibrahim Suleiman al Rabaish of Al-Qaeda in the 
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Arabian Peninsula extolled the destruction of ancient Yemini tombs declaring: ‘here are the 
mujahideen… reviving their jihad in the cause of Allah… they are destroying the domes which 
are being worshipped other than Allah, along with the graves and mausoleums’.80 Islamic State’s 
cultural destruction follows this logic closely. Whilst the destruction of famous sites such as 
Palmyra attracts most attention in Western media, its campaign of destruction is ubiquitous, and 
much of it does not make the headlines. This lower key destruction feeds into the broader aim of 
cultural obliteration, placing territories in its grasp on a trajectory towards religious 
homogenization..81  
Since its inception, Islamic State has consistently attacked places of religious and cultural 
significance across Iraq and Syria. As Sunni Islam considers the Shi’a interpretation of Islam 
heretical, Islamic State has targeted Shi’a sites with particular ferocity. Islamic State attacked the 
following sites in 2014: 24-26 June, Islamic State reportedly destroyed several of Tal Afar’s Shia 
mosques, including the Shia Sheikh Jawad Mosque, Qaddo Mosque, the Mosque of Imam Saad 
bin Aqeel and the Mosque of the Martyr of Lashkar-e-Mulla; 5 July, 2014 Islamic State release 
photos depicting the demolition of the tomb and shrine of Sheikh Fathih in Mosul in addition to 
reportedly destroying a further six mosques and 3 Sunni and Shia shrines; 24 July, a mosque in 
the Al-Muthanna neighbourhood of Mosul was attacked, resulting in a number of Shia leaders 
being arrested; 26 July, the Nabi Jarjees shrine, the Qatheed al-Ban shrines in Mosul were 
destroyed. The following week Islamic State reportedly deployed an IED to destroy a 600 year 
old mosque and 30 Shia Muslim Shrines in Mosul. On 3 August the Shi’a shrine of Sayida 
Zainab and Saiyed Zakariya in Sinjar were destroyed. On 24 October Islamic State destroyed the 
Shoaib Dome, a Shia shrine, in the Sal ad Din province, and in December, the Tomb of Sheikh 
Hamoud al-Hamoud al-Mahmoud and a number of other tombs were destroyed north of 
Fallujah. 
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Sunni, Sufi, Christian and secular heritage sites also came under sustained attack from 
Islamic State forces. In June, Islamic State destroyed parts of the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud 
using IEDs and bulldozers. On 5 July, Islamic State was reported to have removed crosses from 
Chaldean and Orthodox cathedrals and replaced them with Islamic State flags in Muhafazat, 
Nineveh. On 7 July, Islamic State removed the cross from the dome of the St Ephrem Cathedral 
in Mosul. Later in July, Islamic State forces destroyed the mosque of the Prophet Yunus (the Old 
Testament Jonah), at a site that was originally an Assyrian Church, and the shrine of the Prophet 
Sheth in Mosul. In August, Islamic State captured the Christian village of Qaraqosh in Iraq 
before turning churches into firing ranges and destroying the crosses that sit atop them. The bell 
from Iraq’s largest Christian church, the Church of Immaculate Conception, was stolen and 
Christian pilgrimage sites, the church of St Behnam and St Sarah, were also destroyed. Two 
ethnic Yazidi shrines were also destroyed in the town of Sinjar in August. Additionally, Islamic 
State claimed responsibility for an attack on the Sunni mosque of Musab Bin Uayr in Diyala 
province on 22 August that killed an unspecified number of men. On 12 September Islamic State 
destroyed an Orthodox church in the al-Muhaniseen area of Mosul. On 25 October an Islamic 
State IED destroyed the Amerdan shrine, near Mount Sinjar in Iraq. The following day an IED 
also destroyed the Sheikh Mehdi al-Janabi Sufi shrine. Continuing into November, the Sufi 
shrine of Sheikh Saleh, in south Kirkuk was destroyed by Islamic State militants and an IED in 
the city of Tikrit destroyed saw the tomb of Hussein al Majid, father of former Dictator Saddam 
Hussein. It is significant that all this demolition occurred in just the latter part of 2014, solely in 
Iraq. Moreover, this is not an exhaustive list, for even this short period. This rate of destruction 
continues to be pervasive across Islamic State held territory.82 
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Civil Unrest  
Despite the concerted effort to erase everything considered shirk, and homogenize the 
communities under its control by eliminating any resistance, there have nevertheless been 
instances of civil resistance within Islamic State territories. The summer 2014 Sha’itat tribal 
uprising in the town of Abu Hamam, located in the Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor, was the 
most serious. A ‘damage density’ map produced through satellite imagery by the United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research, suggested that by late 2014 the city had suffered the damage 
or destruction of 3,112 structures.83 Whilst the map did not specify what had been damaged, 
anecdotal reports – for example, of Deir ez-Zor’s Armenian Genocide Martyrs’ Memorial 
Church being destroyed – made it reasonable to assume that Islamic State had subjected the 
region to a systematic pattern of violence against cultural heritage.84 
In the face of such attacks, the Sha’itat tribe, which estimates consist of between 70,000 
to 150,000 members, revolted against Islamic State’s rule for reasons including, but not limited 
to, the destruction of villages, the imposition of sectarian rule and economic disputes. 85 
However, it was the manner in which the dispute escalated that is salient to the logic of 
iconoclasm. A report in the Washington Post noted that as life under Islamic State became more 
uncompromisingly sectarian, the public whipping of a man for smoking a cigarette brought local 
discontent to a head.86 The incident provoked the man’s brother to shoot at a passing Islamic 
State patrol, killing one fighter, which led to his execution. In turn, this caused an ‘outpouring of 
rage’ and the expulsion of Islamic State from the village.87 
 Islamic State forces withdrew to a safe distance outside the town to await 
reinforcements. Once these arrived, Islamic State deployed artillery to shell the town for three 
consecutive days, causing catastrophic damage to the built environment. Islamic State fighters 
recaptured the town, rounded up all males over the age of 15, and executed them, leading to a 
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number reports of mass graves holding upwards of 200 bodies.88 Further reports by the Syrian 
Network for Human Rights contend that Islamic State had displaced up to 33,000 people from 
the town of Abu Hamam, and issued a ‘Fatwa’ (an Islamic legal pronouncement) legitimizing the 
confiscation and destruction of property. Later it was reported that Islamic State did begin to 
allow residents to return to the town, but only if they agreed to a stringent list of terms and 
conditions. 89 
Whilst evidence of the specific destruction and targeting of cultural heritage in the 
Sha’itat uprising is limited, Islamic State’s conduct demonstrates the workings of the strategy of 
iconoclasm. The strategy requires viewing from a macro perspective in order to observe the 
intersection of different elements across time and space to create a coherent logic. Thus, the 
expulsion of the population followed by the gradual return under strict terms and conditions 
means those who do return accord with Islamic State’s desired demographic outcome. The 
sustained application of such tactics in combination with the continual degradation of reference 
points to a pre-Islamic/non-Salafi history facilitates Islamic State’s objective of forging 
homogenous communities across the regions it controls. In a manner not dissimilar from the 
Warsaw Uprisings, civil unrest in places like Deir ez-Zor illustrates that Islamic State’s rule 
creates the conditions for civil unrest but also, in the course of its suppression, the circumstances 
through which its goal of cultural obliteration can be furthered. Understanding this point enables 
us to arrive at a more complete understanding of strategy of iconoclasm. 
 
Case Study 3 – Mosul 
Given the relative infancy of Islamic State, combined with the fact that most cities under its 
control tend to be embroiled in civil war, means there have been limited opportunities for it to 
exhibit the reconstruction that forms the third variable in the strategy of iconoclasm. There are, 
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though, indications of what the movement intended to do, given the opportunity. The best 
example was the Iraqi city of Mosul.  
After the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, Mosul witnessed anti-coalition and anti-
government insurgencies. These were primarily associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq, which wanted 
to depose ‘infidels and apostates’ before establishing a shari’a governed state. 90  Historically, 
Mosul was considered a city ‘vibrant with art, culture, coffee shops, and social events. 
Segregation between men and women was rare and there was no pressure, legal or social, to live 
according to shari’ah-leaning conservatism’.91 In June 2014, following the large-scale withdrawal 
of U.S. forces and the decline of the country into another round of internecine strife, Iraqi army 
units abandoned the city, leaving Islamic State fighters free to consolidate their control. Initially, 
the capture of Mosul was thought to be a temporary setback for the Iraqi government, but the 
efficiency with which Islamic State secured the city meant that it turned into a major defeat.92 
Within five days of Mosul’s capture, Islamic State began to distribute a ‘wathiqat al-
madina’, or charter of the city, to the remaining residents. The charter outlined Islamic State’s 
governance of the city in accordance with shari’a. The charter required inter alia that: 
 
• Our stance on tombs, shirk [polytheistic] shrines, and pagan sites, follows what Prophet 
Muhammed said: ‘Do not leave a state but obliterated or a tomb but effaced’. 
 
• To the virtuous women: stay in your homes and do not leave them only in cases of 
necessity. That is guidance of the Mother of the Believers and the dignified female 
companions, may Allah be content with them.93 
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The wathiqat al-madina is significant because it provides insight into how Islamic State envisages 
rule. The wathiqat al-madina also addressed the role of Christians living under Islamic State, who 
were ordered either to pay a heavy tax or leave the city. Any remaining Christian heritage was 
turned into market places for fighters to sell their spoils of war or simply defaced or destroyed.94 
Islamic State’s occupation of Mosul therefore demonstrated a concerted attempt to degrade the 
existing fabric of society by removing large sections of the population and removing and 
delegitimizing symbols associated with polytheism or Christianity. 
Whilst assessments of Islamic State’s theocratic new order are not uncommon, as Aaron 
Zelin notes, its use of ‘soft power’ and civil engineering strategies are often overlooked. 95 
Following the attempt to cleanse the city of anything not aligned with Islamic State’s religiosity, 
the movement invested in public works in order to win popular support. Although Islamic State 
did not promote projects to reconstruct the city of Mosul in the way the Nazis did in Warsaw, it 
did attempt to introduce institutions designed to reinforce a paradigmatic shift in the populace. 
For example, the wathiqat al-madina implemented a system that combined social services with 
religious indoctrination. This policy was intended to alter irreversibly the population’s 
relationship to its intangible heritage.96 Intangible heritage comprises the ‘intricate and complex 
web of meaningful social actions undertaken by individuals, groups and institutions’. 97  The 
survival of complex cultures rests on a delicate web of factors, which, Kurin argues, includes ‘the 
freedom and desire of culture bearers, an adequate environment, a sustaining economic system, a 
political context within which their very existence is at least tolerated’. 98  Consequently, 
introducing a legal system based on shari’a that did not tolerate Mosul’s secular history and civic 
society inexorably degraded the city’s existing intangible heritage, and facilitated the population’s 
rectification from shirk. 
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Iconoclasm in Practice 
This discussion indicates that Islamic State’s management of cultural heritage can be best 
understood as a strategy. Furthermore, the evidence of its operation in practice reveals that the 
strategy serves both pragmatic and dogmatic goals. This dichotomy highlights a paradox within 
Islamic State’s rhetoric. Whilst Islamic State explicitly espouses its intention to prevent the 
spread of shirk, and to realize tawhid [oneness of God], its strategy also discloses a degree of 
pragmatism at odds with this primary goal. If Islamic State were solely concerned with doctrinal 
purity its strategy would dogmatically accord to scripture with little attention paid to any material 
benefits derived from the control and management of cultural heritage. We shall next elucidate 
this paradox in the light of the case studies examined. Treating Islamic State’s strategy in this 
manner enables us to determine the distinctive form of Islamic State’s iconoclastic logic.  
 
Pragmatism  
Clausewitz argued: ‘history has certainly not guided us to any recurrent forms… it is plain that 
circumstances exert an influence that cuts across all general principles… A critic has no right to 
rank the various styles and methods that emerge as if they were stages of excellence, 
subordinating one to the other. They exist side by side, and their use must be judged on its 
merits in each individual case’.99  Clausewitz’s appreciation of strategy is that it needs to be 
flexible and react meaningfully to the circumstances of the moment. To have utility, strategy has 
to be pragmatic, because it is ‘an attempt [or threat thereof] to make concrete a set of objectives 
through the application of military force to a particular case’.100 Moreover, taken together with 
the observation that war and policy are continuations of one another, it makes sense to 
comprehend the way in which strategies are pragmatically constructed, and subsequently 
implemented, to achieve desired ends. Furthermore, Clausewitz maintained that striking at the 
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schwerpunkt, or the ‘centre of gravity’, provides one of the clearest routes to victory.101 An enemy’s 
centre of gravity is variable and can be what matters to an opponent, or what you make matter to 
an opponent, but it is most often associated with the capture of the enemy’s capital or the defeat 
of its main armies in battle. The point is, however, that it is a pragmatic consideration that 
connects military operations to political outcomes. 
Islamic State’s targeting of the Syrian regime’s perceived centre of gravity demonstrates 
the pragmatic nature of its strategy. Simpson notes: ‘the capture of a fortress, for example, may 
be of no military significance… but may be significant as a prize in wars fought for more limited 
political advantage’.102 Palmyra represents just such a pragmatic lever to gain a political advantage 
over an opponent through their centre of gravity. As has been pointed out, the Syrian capital, 
Damascus, is almost wholly reliant either upon the gas extracted in the fields surrounding 
Palmyra or the gas piped through the region from Syria’s eastern provinces. Additionally, the 
Syrian regime has been locked in a battle with rebel forces in Damascus since the start of the 
civil war with the regime drawing on support from Iranian and Hezbollah forces to maintain a 
degree of control.103 Clearly, Damascus represents the regime’s centre of gravity, and holding it is 
crucial to its survival. 104 These facts have enabled Islamic State to manipulate the regime by 
targeting the capital’s power supply. Damascus has been hit by continual power outages, with 
reports suggesting that Syria as a whole is ‘83 percent darker at night that it was before the 
war’,105 thus turning electricity into an economic asset to be leveraged or sold for profit. When 
resources in war become scarce then the politics and the forms of war often reflect this fact as 
we have seen with Islamic State’s leveraging of the Syrian regime into negotiating concessions 
for resources. 106 
Beyond leveraging the supply of natural resources derived from Palmyra, the way in 
which Islamic State promulgated the destruction of Palmyra further illustrates its pragmatism. It 
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might be useful here to construct a strategic narrative, which Simpson defines as the explanation 
of actions identified before, during and after a conflict. ‘A policy outcome’, he maintains, ‘is 
ultimately an impression upon an audience. It can be a physical impression…[or] a psychological 
impression, typically defined in terms of an evolution in political alignment, not necessarily by 
consent. For strategy to connect action to policy it must therefore invest them with a given 
meaning in relation to its audiences, both prospectively and retrospectively’.107 
The question that this raises is what meaning did Islamic State hope to invest in the 
propagation of Palmyra’s destruction and what evolution of political alignment did it hope to 
achieve? The meaning that Islamic State attributes to its actions is that its members are emulating 
the life of Mohammad, who was required to ‘make tawhid known [with] open enmity and 
disavowal towards shirk’.108 The performative nature of the destruction captured on video at 
Palmyra appropriates the heritage of the legacy, transmogrifying it into a religious genealogy to 
enrich Islamic State’s media narrative.109 An iconic act of violence can, in the words of Boal, et al, 
‘take over the image-machinery for a moment – and a moment, in the timeless echo chamber of 
the spectacle, may now eternally be all there is’.110 The dissemination of the image is designed to 
mobilize its consumers. The heritage that is chosen for destruction is chosen to fit with the 
historicized re-enactment of idol destruction. The media coverage of these acts is widely 
publicized as the antithesis of Western, secular liberal democracy and constitutes the raison d’etre 
for Islamic State’s promulgation of this mode of cultural destruction.  
In terms, then, of the desired change in political alignment that such propaganda hopes 
to achieve, it feeds into a general desire to transform ordinary Muslims into ‘violent-
rejectionists’,111 or what is commonly termed ‘Jihadis’ (Holy warriors). The construction of a 
strategic narrative is ‘designed to persuade people of something’.112 Considering that Islamic 
State broadly considers that ‘all tenets of secularism – including nationalism, communism, and 
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Baathism – are a blatant violation of Islam’,113 it is logical to conclude that a large part of Islamic 
State’s purpose is to persuade the broader Muslim population to come to the same realization. 
Maher observes: ‘violent-rejectionists are irreconcilably estranged from the state, regarding it as a 
heretical and artificial unit. The entire notion of the modern nation-state is a heterodox affront 
to Islam whereby temporal legislation usurps God’s sovereignty’. From this perspective: ‘The 
system needs radical overhaul and re-ordering while its agents must be confronted’. ‘Armed and 
violent rebellion against them is an individual duty on every Muslim’.114 Thus, the evolution of 
political alignment requires the transformation of Muslims from passive onlookers to violent-
rejectionists, who understand and act upon their obligations to satisfy the tenets of tawhid and 
prevent the spread of shirk. Destroying parts of Palmyra, rather than destroying it in its entirety, 
appears therefore a logical practice to advance this agenda. Maximizing the amount of media 
coverage gained by gradually increasing the grandeur of destruction over a sustained period of 
time shows how Islamic State profits through this pragmatism. 
 
Dogmatism 
Understanding a dogmatic application of doctrine, theological, military or otherwise, from a 
strategic perspective is complex. Whilst the analysis has thus far sought to demonstrate Islamic 
State’s iconoclasm to be strategic, it is possible to invert such thinking by pointing to a puzzle 
Simpson identified, namely: to ‘Dogmatically… retain a political aim in conflicts which are of 
lower stakes than national survival is potentially to push military activity further than its political 
unity’.115 Pursuing a policy for any other reason than the needs of survival treads a dangerous line 
between the desire to win via the attainment of realizable goals, and a counterproductive, 
unyielding approach rooted in a rigid application of orthodoxy for its own sake. 
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Islamic State’s doctrine, in relation to cultural heritage, has focused on eliminating shirk 
and affirming God’s oneness. In a 2007 speech Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi quoted a Wahhabi-
trained scholar on the purpose of jihad: ‘The end to which fighting the unbelievers leads is no 
idolater (mushrik) remaining in the world’. 116  In another speech Baghdadi emphasized the 
importance of destroying any ‘statues’ or ‘graves’ associated with shirk: 
We believe in the necessity of destroying and eradicating all manifestations of idolatry 
and prohibiting those things that lead to it, on account of what the Imam Muslim 
transmitted in his Sahih on the authority of Abu ’l-Hayaj al-Asadi, who said: ‘Ali ibn Abi 
Talib—may God be pleased with him—said to me: Should I not urge you to do what the 
Messenger of God—may God bless and save him—urged me to do? That you not leave 
a statue without obliterating it, or a raised grave without leveling it?’117 
 
However, if Clausewitz’s observation that there are no truly hard lessons of war118 is applied, it 
raises the paradox that all war is unique, yet all doctrine is, in theory, static and unmoveable.119 
Ultimately, this paradox is irresolvable. This clash of rigid doctrine and the exceptionality of war 
come together in the assault on the al-Askari shrine in the Iraqi city of Samarra.  
 Shi’a Islam considers the al-Askari shrine one of its holiest sites. Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda in Iraq movement bombed the shrine in 2006 in a ‘well executed 
commando-style… raid of insurgents dressed as Iraqi police’.120 This act intentionally sparked 
Iraq’s brutal sectarian conflict.121 Following the attack, violence by sectarian militias across the 
country grew exponentially. Come 2014, when what was then called the Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant, or ISIL, began its northern Iraq offensive there was great concern amongst Shi’a 
communities regarding the safety of the shrine. By June 2014 the ISIL offensive gained 
considerable ground around Samarra after insurgents armed with rocket-propelled grenades, 
anti-aircraft weapons, heavy weaponry and armoured vehicles took the districts of Muthanna, al-
Jubairiyah, Salaheddine, al-Shuhada and destroyed the Rasasi bridge leading into Samarra. 122 
Subsequently, Islamic State announced that it considered the destruction of the al-Askari shrine 
the primary objective. 123 However, declaring its primary target in advance of actually being in a 
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position to capture it illustrated the strategic weakness in Islamic State’s dogmatism. The 
announcement gave the Iraqi army, and Iraqi population more generally, forewarning that the 
shrine would be destroyed upon capture. This catalyzed two events: first, the Iraqi army 
conducted a mass offensive to drive ISIL out of the neighbourhoods it had captured through 
artillery shelling and airstrikes from newly delivered Russian Sukhoi 25 warplanes, which 
provided close air support.124 Second, it enabled the mobilization of Shi’a militiamen who were 
positioned around the shrine to protect it from ISIL attacks.125 The result was that ISIL forces 
deployed to capture the city withdrew (subsequently joining the successful offensive to capture 
Mosul).126  Thus, through doctrinal rigidity ISIL betrayed its strategic position by not taking 
account of broader considerations, arguably to the detriment of its own stated goals. If ISIL had 
done so it would have concluded, from the response to al-Zaqarwi’s bomb attack in 2006, that 
drawing as little attention as possible to its real target would have provided the best possible 
chance of success. In reality the threat to destroy the shrine was seen as an escalation of the 
conflict resulting in increased preparations on the part of the Iraqi state to thwart ISIL’s 
objectives. 
 
The Logic of Islamic State’s Strategy of Iconoclasm 
Returning to the trinity of factors that combine to constitute the logic of iconoclasm, we can 
now assess whether this logic prevailed in Islamic State’s strategy of destruction. First, we 
contended that for a strategy of iconoclasm to exist it is necessary to degrade and delegitimize 
the existing fabric of society. The evidence to support this exists across each of the cases studies 
presented. Consider the proclamation of Islamic State commander Abu Leith in Palmyra: 
‘concerning the historical city… what we will do is to pulverise statues that the miscreants used 
to pray for’.127 Additionally, followers of Sufism are regularly accused of shirk, bid’a, and of being 
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kuffars and polytheists. Islamic State’s narrative, reinforced through its actions, consistently 
dehumanized adherents of other Islamic sects, representing them as the antithesis of the 
teachings of the Prophet, accusing them of incompetence in religious matters, and denouncing 
their heritage as idolatrous.  
The ideology of Islamic State brings its adherents to a position where the degradation 
and de-legitimization of the symbols of polytheism is not only permissible but also desirable in 
order to maintain confessional authenticity. In this respect, the obligation in Islam to link 
‘salvation to works rather than just faith alone’,128 evolved heuristically as a ‘series of global 
effects’129 after 9/11 when Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri combined the ideas of 
tawhid with ‘revolutionary change which involves the implementation of shari’a, political authority 
for Islam and an end to occupation’. ‘The dichotomy between tawhid and everything else’, Maher 
contends, ‘was absolute… the practical outcome of this was… political absolutism… incapable 
of accepting compromise’.130 Islamic State’s rhetoric, whether it emanates from commanders at 
Palmyra or spiritual leaders like Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, are not isolated speech acts. They add 
up to a unified statement of political intent. Just as the statements of President Tudjman about 
Mostar or Himmler’s about Warsaw were integral to their understandings of total obliteration, so 
too must we understand Islamic State’s pronouncements in the same light.  
Second, a strategy of iconoclasm requires the removal of all reference to the previous 
society. Arguably, this is the most important stage of iconoclasm for it acts as the bridge between 
ideology and practice, and is often exhibited in attempts to destroy the heterogeneity of the 
population. The ideology of Islamic State maintains that it is not merely acceptable to destroy 
heritage but that it is positively desirable in order to prevent the spread of unbelief. Islamic 
State’s occupation techniques clearly demonstrate coordinated efforts to destroy pre-existing 
social structures. This is exemplified in the campaign of cultural destruction seen in the latter 
 32 
part of 2014 in Iraq. These assaults were, on the whole, not undertaken to gain a military 
advantage. Indeed, the stated intention to attack the al-Askari shrine proved wholly 
counterproductive from a military perspective. Instead, such attacks were designed to alter the 
demographic composition of the population and the built environment. Mosul represents a good 
example. The capture of this formerly pluralistic, secular, city saw Islamic State attempting to 
break down heterogeneous communities, established over generations, by making clear that any 
lifestyle, not in accordance with shari’a, was repugnant and punishable.  
Finally, it was argued that the attempt to reconstruct society in a manner consistent with 
the new order constitutes the final element in the logic of iconoclasm. The wathiqat al-madina 
suggests how Islamic State envisioned cities under its control should be governed. In practice, as 
Islamic State’s occupation of Mosul again shows, its rule seeks to move the population towards 
an ultraconservative orthodoxy by introducing institutions, such as shari’a courts and religious 
lectures, that reinforce this paradigm shift. The response to the civil uprisings by the Sha’itat 
tribe in Deir ez-Zor region further illustrates this intent. The ferociousness of Islamic State’s 
reaction to the challenge to its authority not only shocked the tribe into submission but also 
enabled Islamic State to expel large numbers of people from their homes, allowing the return 
only of those who agreed to live under a strictly defined code of shari’a. Islamic State’s purpose 
in each case was to recreate society and to align the social and physical environment in 
accordance with its scriptural certitudes.  
 
Conclusion 
The destruction of heritage in Iraq and Syria by Islamic State is often interpreted as a challenge 
to secular Western notions of culture and tradition. Consequently, Islamic State’s actions are 
frequently denounced as barbaric. Whilst understandable, this analysis has shown that such 
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denunciation obscures the intent underlying the strategy of Islamic State. The events in Iraq and 
Syria are, moreover, by no means unprecedented. Instead they fit within the conceptual 
boundaries of iconoclasm identified in earlier conflicts such as the Balkans and World War II. In 
this context, Islamic State’s iconoclasm is a logical counterpart to its aestheticization of extreme, 
violence. Both are intended to induce a sense of hopelessness in its adversaries, and are recorded 
in videos and disseminated across the Internet.  
Even so, it may also be argued that Islamic State’s iconoclasm is failing. At the time of 
writing, Islamic State has lost both territory and fighters.131 If – or when – its own ‘capital’ in 
Raqqa falls it may retreat into the shadow world of a clandestine jihadist network instead of 
functioning as a quasi-political entity that controls the monopoly of violence in a territorial unit 
of rule.  
Nonetheless,, Islamic State’s ability to seize and hold territory for several years attests to 
its effectiveness. No doubt, other factors such as Sunni anger at the Iraqi government’s sectarian 
rule and the collapse of central authority in Syria following the country’s descent into civil war 
also contributed to Islamic State’s initial success This study has not sought to assess the efficacy 
of Islamic State’s cultural destruction per se but to understand its instrumentalization, and to this 
end employed the precepts of strategic theory. Clausewitz may seem an unusual figure to 
introduce into an analysis of cultural heritage but his thinking remains pertinent. One of his most 
acute observations is that the outcome of conflict is never final because those who have been 
defeated often consider their loss transitory. To achieve a final victory the mind of the opponent 
must be subjugated. Conquering the mind cannot, however, be achieved purely by military force. 
Instead, it requires manipulating an opponent into recognizing that any further resistance to the 
new regime will be futile. This paper has demonstrated that conquering the mind through 
targeting the built environment are evident in Islamic State’s strategic approach.  
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Clausewitz maintained that notions of force could be understood within a trinity: three 
autonomous elements united in one, arising out of the constant interplay of popular passions, 
reason and chance.132 In terms of the strategy of iconoclasm, passion relates to the motivation of 
the iconoclast; chance relates to the opportunities that present themselves through capturing 
heritage sites; reason relates to the objectives that can be achieved through either dogmatic or 
pragmatic management of the captured heritage sites. It has also been demonstrated that the 
logic of iconoclasm possesses a further trinity that becomes manifest through the combination 
of independent variables: first, an attempt to degrade and delegitimize the existing fabric of 
society; second, the removal of references to the previous social order; and third, an attempt to 
reconstruct society in conformity to a new ideological order. For a strategy of iconoclasm to be 
confirmed these three elements need to be present. Whatever the future holds for Islamic State, 
this study has shown that all these elements were present in the territory it controlled between 
2014 and 2017. 
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